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I. INTRODUCTION
Financial integration can make major contributions to economic development, but it is
not free of risks. On the positive side, free cross-border capital mobility can foster
additional investment at a lower cost and expedite economic growth. Capital flows have
been shown to facilitate the transfer of new technology, ease access to foreign export
markets, increase competitiveness, and develop domestic capital markets. Portfolio
diversification and consumption smoothing are facilitated by capital mobility. But an
open capital account can also increase local vulnerability and exposure to external
shocks. Well-known examples of risks from open capital accounts include economic
overheating due to large current-account deficits, asset price bubbles, and excessive risk
taking in the financial and corporate sectors. Since capital flows are highly volatile,
recipient countries may also become more exposed to contagion and herding behavior
of international investors. 
To enjoy the advantages of financial integration, Chile has opened completely to capital
flows, and at the same time it has built strong institutions to deal with the associated2
risks. Today the Chilean economy is much better prepared than in the past to confront
the challenges of financial openness. This has been widely recognized by international
financial markets, and demonstrated by its response to “real life” stress tests, such as
crises in other economies in the region, and the world economic slowdown. 
The institutional cornerstones of Chile’s current macroeconomic stability include its
monetary regime based on inflation targeting, its fiscal policy based on a structural
budget surplus rule, and a floating exchange rate. Financial stability is supported by
credible institutions and effective regulations, which include technical supervisory
bodies devoted to specific financial and capital-market segments. Regarding
international financial integration, the Chilean economy has a high and growing degree
of integration into the world economy, with a fully open capital account since 2001.
This paper describes the policy framework and institutions that are helping Chile to reap
the benefits of financial integration at minimum risks, as well as key aspects of the
process of building such frameworks and institutions. It is structured as follows. Section
II reviews the key elements of Chile’s macroeconomic policy framework: monetary
policy based on central bank independence and inflation targeting, a floating exchange
rate regime, and coordination of monetary policy with a rule-based fiscal policy. Section
III analyzes financial sector development, regulation, and monitoring. Section IV
discusses the current open stance of the capital account. Section V explains the long
process involved in building Chile’s current institutions, focusing on the opening of the
capital account and its relation with other policies and institutions. Concluding remarks
are in section VI.
 
II. MONETARY POLICY FRAMEWORK AND INSTITUTIONS
II.1. MONETARY POLICY UNDER INFLATION TARGETING
The Constitutional Organic Act of the Central Bank of Chile (Ley Orgánica
Constitucional del Banco Central de Chile) defines the Bank’s policy objectives as “to
ensure the stability of the currency and the normal functioning of domestic and external
payments.” Stability of the currency is commonly understood as price stability, that is,
a low and stable inflation rate. The normal functioning of internal and external
payments has been interpreted as the absence of crisis in the payments system and in the
balance of payments. 
The above mandate is strongly associated with the Central Bank of Chile (CBC)’s
autonomy, enshrined in the Constitutional Law. This law contains some important
institutional aspects worth highlighting. It establishes a governance structure that fosters
a long-term vision. It also prohibits the CBC from lending to the fiscal sector by
acquiring any securities issued by the State, its agencies or enterprises. Finally, it grants
it the freedom to determine monetary and exchange rate policies. 
Of all the possible monetary regimes, the CBC opted for a full-fledged version of
inflation targeting, as some industrial countries have been using for some time. This was
fully implemented in 2000, when the Central Bank formally adopted this approach to
monetary policy, together with procedures for regular monetary policy meetings,
forecasting tools and models, and began publishing periodical inflation reports that3
include explicit inflation forecasts. To complement its inflation-targeting regime, the
CBC adopted a floating exchange rate regime, strengthening its anchor and its own
management of monetary policy. 
TABLE 1: CHILE: MAIN INDICATORS, 1990 – 2003.
1990-95 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
CPI Inflation rate (%) 13.5 6.3 5.5 3.9 2.7 4.3 2.3 2.9 1.0
Inflat. Target rate (%) 12.2 6.5 5.5 4.5 4.3 3.5 3.0 3.0 3.0
GDP Growth rate (%) 7.9 7.4 6.6 3.2 -0.8 4.5 3.4 2.2 3.3
Fiscal Balance/ GDP 1.7 2.1 1.8 0.4 -1.4 0.1 -0.3 -0.8 -0.8
Gross Domestic Investment/GDP 26.1 26.4 27.4 27.0 22.2 23.2 23.2 23.0 23.4
Unemployment rate (%) 7.4 6.5 6.1 6.2 9.7 9.2 9.2 9.0 8.5
Real Wage growth rate (%) 6.6 3.2 1.9 3.8 2.1 0.9 3.0 1.1 2.4
Interest rate (%) 7.0 7.1 6.7 9.3 6.4 6.1 4.4 2.3 1.5
(X+M)/GDP (%) 37.9 43.9 46.5 46.9 45.4 46.7 49.4 48.8 52.0
Current Account/GDP (%) -2.3 -4.1 -4.4 -4.9 0.1 -1.0 -1.7 -0.8 -1.2
RER (Year 2000=100) 115.6 98.4 90.9 90.7 95.7 100.0 111.3 113.2 122.5
Terms of Trade (Year 2000=100) 169.3 120.3 134.9 173.3 93.2 100.0 94.6 64.3 95.1
Gross Capital Flows/GDP (%) 3.9 8.0 9.5 6.9 15.5 6.3 8.4 4.3 6.5
International Reserves/GDP (%) 19.5 20.9 22.1 20.5 20.5 20.1 21.0 22.8 22.0
 Source: Central Bank of Chile
Since 2001, Chile’s inflation target has been defined as a 2% - 4% target range, centered
on 3% annual inflation. The headline CPI variation is used as the inflation target
measure over a 24-month policy horizon, based on an estimate of how long it takes for
monetary policy changes to have an effect on inflation. Monetary policy responds to
deviations of the Central Bank’s inflation forecast (and the gap between actual and
potential output) from the 3% inflation target over the 24-month policy horizon. While
the ultimate policy goal is to achieve the inflation target, policy focuses on inflation
forecasts. This regime is sometimes called “inflation-forecast” targeting.
The CBC’s operational target is the overnight interest rate on interbank loans. Monetary
policy instruments include open-market operations (OMOs), standing facilities, and
legal bank reserves. OMOs are the main instrument for managing liquidity according to
an operational target level determined by the Central Bank’s Board. They take the form
of twice-weekly auctions of Central Bank securities maturing within one year. Liquidity
management is fine-tuned by complementary repurchase and reverse repurchase
operations. Standing facilities are credit lines that provide liquidity at higher interest
rates, to discourage use at normal times. Reserve requirements on bank deposits are not
used as a monetary policy instrument and in fact have remained unchanged since 1980. 
The Central Bank believes that transparency and accountability should be crucial
features of monetary policy and has acted accordingly. The monthly schedule of
monetary policy meetings is announced in advance and a press release and minutes are
published shortly after each meeting. The four-monthly Monetary Policy Report is
widely circulated by Board members and managers. The Bank’s macroeconomic
projections model, statistical data, and policy and research papers are published
regularly on paper and uploaded to the Bank’s website. By law, the Central Bank is
accountable to the Chilean Senate. After every Report’s release, the Central Bank
Governor and Board present the analyses and projections therein to the Senate. 4
Monetary policy is conducted according to modern views about its power and limits. In
the long term, money is neutral and hence affects only nominal variables (i.e. inflation),
but not real variables. However, in the short- to medium-term, monetary policy affects
economic activity, employment, and relative prices, in addition to inflation.
Monetary policy can contribute to output stabilization, as long as this is consistent with
its primary objective of meeting the inflation target. This occurs when demand shocks
dominate supply shocks, i.e., when output (or the output gap) is positively correlated
with inflation. Under such circumstances, the Central Bank contributes actively to
stabilizing both inflation and output, applying a counter-cyclical monetary policy. Since
2002 the counter-cyclical stance of monetary policy has been reinforced, as reflected by
an increasingly expansionary monetary policy in response to the combination of below-
target actual inflation and lower–than-potential actual output. Currently, low interest
rates are in fact pushing inflation and GDP more quickly toward their target (potential)
levels. 
Monetary policy does not deal with volatile capital flows directly. However, when
changes in their level or volatility affect other macroeconomic variables, and ultimately
economic activity and inflation, monetary policy reacts, and can have an effect on
capital flows. This procedure is consistent with the Central Bank’s mandate and
contributes to more effective and dependable monetary policy management in Chile.
II.2. THE FLOATING EXCHANGE RATE REGIME
As discussed above, the Central Bank of Chile has complemented inflation targeting
with a floating exchange rate regime. This regime was implemented in 1999, at around
the same time inflation targeting was consolidated, and after the Board of the Bank
estimated that conditions for dealing with external shocks had improved sufficiently.
These topics will be referred to in section V.
Considering Chile’s floating exchange rate regime and rising creditworthiness in
international capital markets, the need for holding large amounts of international
reserves has been reduced. However, the declining risk premium on Chile’s external
liabilities has also lowered the Central Bank’s cost of carrying reserves. In this context,
the Central Bank is implementing a program to redeem part of its dollar-linked debt
with international reserves, which is expected to reduce its current level of reserves.
Still, it will continue to maintain significant international reserves for two reasons: one,
because reserves contribute to reduce country-risk premium and act as a buffer against
possible liquidity shocks; and two, because reserves are the means that permits
monetary authorities to intervene credibly in the exchange market under exceptional
circumstances.
Like most other central banks, the CBC can conduct sterilized foreign exchange
interventions to counteract excessive volatility. The Central Bank acted decisively to
avoid the negative consequences of the exchange rate overreacting to shocks.
Acknowledging the difficulties involved in identifying “excessive” exchange rate
shocks, the Central Bank’s interventions aim not at maintaining a particular exchange
rate level, but rather at avoiding major exchange rate volatility.5
Since the flexible exchange rate regime was introduced in 1999, on two occasions has
the Central Bank considered exchange rate depreciation big enough to warrant its
intervention in the exchange rate market. Both times the Central Bank announced the
time horizon for its sterilized interventions (August-December 2001 and October 2002-
February 2003), the total amount of resources that would be used, and the form of the
intervention,
1 although specific amounts and dates of each intervention were not
disclosed in advance. An empirical evaluation of both intervention episodes suggests
that their effects on the spot market were slight and in most cases negligible. However,
the evidence also shows that the announcements themselves affected the spot exchange
rate significantly; i.e. the impact of Central Bank actions on the exchange rate came
mainly from the authorities’ public announcement. 
The current exchange rate regime provides indirect mechanisms to deal with volatile
capital flows. In the first place, since the exchange rate fluctuates according to market
conditions, no gains can be made from betting against the authorities, so a potential
source of capital flow volatility (speculation against the currency and the currency
regime) is eliminated. In this sense, a flexible exchange regime provides an effective
buffer against this source of volatile capital flows. In the second place, the CBC
maintains significant international reserves. Hence, the monetary authority has the
means to act against any excessive (temporary) exchange rate depreciation and
volatility, in the event of a large liquidity shock.
II.3. MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICY COORDINATION
The CBC’s policy framework is complemented and supported by a responsible and
sound fiscal stance. In fact, the Ministry of Finance has adopted a structural surplus
rule. This rule—quite exceptional in the world—defines a resource envelope for fiscal
policy, determined as an annual, general government’s structural budget surplus
equivalent to 1% of GDP. The difference between the structural and the actual budget
surplus is determined by the deviation from trend levels of GDP and the price of copper,
weighted by their impact on government revenue. Accordingly, the government
recorded actual deficits during 2000-2003 and is expected to record a budget surplus in
2004, thus satisfying the 1%-of-GDP structural surplus rule since its inception.
Fiscal policy therefore plays a significant counter-cyclical role, complementing the
Central Bank’s also counter-cyclical policy framework. Counter-cyclical or stabilizing
policies are only feasible when macroeconomic institutions are strong and policy rules
are credible. Recent international evidence shows that countries with low risk premiums
on their sovereign liabilities are more likely to adopt counter-cyclical policies.
2 Among
these, Chile, with country risk premiums currently under 100 basis points, has applied
some of the strongest counter-cyclical policies among emerging economies,
contributing more effectively to stabilizing output.
                                                          
1 On both occasions, the Central Bank announced that it would intervene both directly in the spot market and through
swaps between domestic currency- and foreign currency-denominated bonds issued by the Bank.
2  Calderón and Schmidt-Hebbel (2003) and Calderón et al. (2004) provide evidence that shows that emerging
economies with low (high) country risk premiums exhibit counter- (pro-) cyclical fiscal and monetary policies. 6
Institutionalization of policy rules by both the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank
has simplified policy coordination. Chile’s experience illustrates that, when institutions
and policy rules are strengthened, policies can be coordinated by design and involve
less haggling over the best response to any given shock that affects the macro economy.
III. FINANCIAL SECTOR DEVELOPMENT, REGULATION AND MONITORING
The structure and soundness of the domestic financial sector, and the effectiveness of
the local regulatory framework, help explain the differences in how financial integration
and free capital flows affect economies around the globe. Developing a healthy, robust
and well-regulated financial system is vital to reduce the impact of external shocks in
increasingly integrated countries. Chile’s sound financial system, with its effective
regulation and supervision, is the result of a continuous process of reforms and
modernization, and has become a valuable tool to confront adverse scenarios. 
These developments help to explain Chile’s ability to withstand without dramatic
adjustments various real-life “stress tests” that have originated abroad. For most of the
1990s, Chile had large (considering the small size of its economy and financial sector)
foreign capital inflows; toward the end of the decade it had to deal with the
consequences of financial turmoil in a number of emerging markets, which stopped
international financial flows to emerging markets; and in recent years some countries in
Latin America have endured periods of severe financial difficulties. 
Currently, the Chilean financial sector is relatively well developed, considering the size
and per capita income of its economy. At the end of 2003, total bank assets amounted to
US$78.8 billion, representing 110% of GDP (see table 2). The financial system also
includes an active corporate bond market, a growing foreign exchange derivatives
market and a local risk-rating industry. A resilient, well-regulated and supervised
banking sector provides local firms and consumers with short-term financing, while
sizable institutional investors, mainly pension and mutual funds and insurance
companies, offer long-term financing for projects and investments. Operations by
institutions in the financial sector are supervised and regulated by specialized agencies. 
Chile’s banking industry is currently made up of 26 institutions, which are allowed to
supply the full range of commercial banking services. Nonetheless, some provide
universal financial services, while others focus on specific market segments, such as
trading in fixed income instruments. Table 2 also shows that, on average, Chilean banks
have a 14.1% Basel capital adequacy ratio and a 16.6% return on equity. 
Regulations governing the banking system are contained in the general banking law
enacted in 1986.
3 This law took a conservative approach to the range of permissible
commercial bank operations, to reduce moral hazard and systemic risk. However, a
substantial reform in 1997 and the resolution of the subordinated debt problem of some
large banks
4 resulted in a legislation permitting a broader range of services and the
internationalization of the banking sector. Further amendments to the general banking
law were adopted to stimulate competition by reducing initial capital requirements for
new commercial banks, provided they maintain a higher regulatory capital (the reform
                                                          
3 Ley General de Bancos, Decreto N° 3. 
4 Inherited from the 1982 crisis.7
set the minimum capital adequacy ratio at 12% of risk-weighted assets, for institutions
that enter the market with a capital equivalent to half the minimum capital required to
create a bank). Bank regulation also establishes additional capital and reserve
requirements in case of bank mergers that might result in a single entity holding a
“significant” market share. 
The supervisory agency (Superintendencia de Bancos e Instituciones Financieras) has
the authority to regulate and oversee credit risk, and to supervise market and liquidity
risks. This agency recently set forth a new risk-rating system for credit operations and
loan loss provisions that distinguishes between several commercial products, broadens
the risk category buckets, and gives more importance to banks’ internal risk-rating
model. Banks are also required to report their ratings on a monthly basis, as opposed to
the quarterly frequency required previously.
TABLE 2: CHILEAN FINANCIAL SECTOR (DECEMBER 2003)
BANKING SECTOR
US$ million 78,867 55,885 913 14.10% 16.60% 31,583
% GDP 109.5% 77.5% 1.3% 43.8%
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Source: Central Bank of Chile
In the early 1980s, Chile passed important legislation on the regulation and supervision
of capital markets, particularly the securities market law and the publicly traded
companies law.
5 Both govern and monitor the issue and trading of securities and
                                                          
5 Ley de Mercado de Valores and Ley de Sociedades Anónimas.8
operations by stock exchanges and insurance companies. The securities market law
favors competition and has helped to modernize the securities brokerage business. It
also requires formal, ongoing risk-rating procedures by independent agencies for the
issuing of securities seeking to be eligible for pension fund investment. Thus, the
regulations encouraged the development of a local risk-rating industry, the relevant
analysis of information on risks inherent in the issuers and the securities that they offer
in the market.
The legal framework also provides corporate governance rules and regulations on
potential conflict of interests for both pension fund managers and corporate board
members and officers. Rules and procedures also govern the acquisition of controlling
stakes in publicly traded companies, to protect the rights of minority shareholders and
improve corporate governance rules.
As mentioned, institutional investors play a fundamental role in the Chilean financial
sector. Pension and mutual funds and life insurance companies are the country’s largest
institutional investors, managing a combined total of US$74 billion or 102% of GDP in
assets. The pension system is based on mandatory individual savings accounts
administered by private companies. These savings are invested in financial instruments,
creating a continuous flow of long-run resources to be allocated to the rest of the local
economy through the financial system. Operations by these investors are regulated and
supervised by the Superintendent of Pension Fund Managers, the State’s specialized
supervisory agency. Key aspects of current regulations include a complex set of
diversification requirements and five types of funds for affiliates to allocate their
savings. These range from fund “A” with extensive potential exposure to variable
income securities through to fund “E,” characterized by low duration, fixed income
securities. To allow for proper risk diversification, pension funds can invest in a wide
range of instruments, including foreign securities (up to 30% of total funds).
The regulations are also intended to facilitate small and medium-sized companies’
access to the capital market and address the reduced liquidity of local stock markets.
Indeed, flexible rules permit the creation of a market where equity issued by “emerging”
companies can be traded, and provide limited capital gains tax exemptions for investors
in such companies. Also, the existing 1,2% stamp tax on credit operations can be rolled
over in the case of commercial paper issuance for the purposes of financing short-term
working capital. There is no income tax for foreign investors and local agents investing
in high-turnover stocks. Banks, mutual funds and insurance companies, which can now
open and manage voluntary individual savings accounts, have introduced additional
competition. Flexible portfolio limits, rules, and regulations govern insurance
companies’ mutual and investment funds.
6 
An interesting feature in the evolution of Chilean capital markets was the relatively
early development of a corporate bond market with maturities as long as 20 and even 30
years in some cases. The market value of corporate bonds issued is estimated at
US$11.1 billion or 15.5% of GDP (see table 2). This notable characteristic can be
explained by several factors, such as the existence of pension funds and life insurance
companies with long-term liabilities, a well-developed market for central bank
                                                          
6 The regulation was introduced in 2001 as part of a major reform to the capital market, commonly known
as Capital Markets Reforms I. 9
securities that provides benchmarks for the pricing of long-term debt, and the extensive
use of the “Unidad de Fomento” (UF, a CPI-indexed unit of account) in most long-term
contracts, including the issuance of financial securities.
The range of available securities-related products in the Chilean market is significant
compared to elsewhere in the region, and includes increasing amounts of long-term
mortgage-backed securities and mortgage bonds (mostly denominated in UF, and
maturing in an average term of 12 years), shorter-term commercial paper, and structured
finance. The CBC has recently issued 10-year nominal bonds with similar design
characteristics to the benchmark indexed bonds issued regularly. 
The growing development of a deep and liquid market for foreign exchange derivatives,
mainly in the form of non-deliverable forward contracts, NDFs, is another interesting
feature of the Chilean financial system. However, the use of other derivative products,
such as interest rate and equity derivatives, remains very limited to date. A floating
exchange rate regime increases the demand for hedging among local companies with
international trade operations or foreign exchange exposure on the liabilities side of
their balance sheets, while pension funds have become important counterparts due to
their interest in hedging the currency exposure associated to their investments abroad. 
Finally, the CBC has recently developed new initiatives that will contribute to further
modernize and reduce risks in the financial system. These include modernizing the
payments system, which comprises mainly the introduction and management of a real
time gross settlement system, and a delivery-versus-payment (DVP) mechanism for
debt and securities instruments. Also, the Central Bank launched on August 19
th the first
issue of its Financial Stability Report, a periodical publication which will monitor the
strengths and vulnerabilities of the main sectors of the economy that are relevant to the
stability of the internal and external payments system. Lastly, the Central Bank, jointly
with the Superintendence of Banks, recently reviewed its regulation on liquidity risk
and is in the process of revising regulation of market risks. These reviews involve
replacing a rules-based regulatory system by a regulatory framework where the
emphasis is put on the adequate measurement of these risks—coherent with
international standards—and closer involvement of the boards of banking institutions on
policy decisions. It also implies thorough supervisory oversight of the associated
regulatory requirements, like the periodic practice of stress-testing exercises.
 
Despite these developments, the Chilean financial system still faces important
challenges. For instance, the banking industry’ consolidation process has significantly
changed the environment in which it operates and produced important efficiency gains:
looking forward, it is important that the banking sector continues to modernize, further
improving efficiency and keeping risks low. Also, liquidity in the equity and debt
markets is still poor. Similarly, small and medium-sized companies still have limited
access to long-term funding. 
Some of these aspects have been addressed in a second major reform to capital market
regulation that is currently being discussed in the Senate. Among other things, this
reform considers new incentives for funding risky projects in the form of tax
exemptions, collateralization, and the reduction of transaction costs. Recent reforms
should help to overcome these issues, enhancing the financial system’s fundamental10
role of intermediary between savers and investors, thus contributing to the growth and
integration of the Chilean economy into the global economy. 
IV. CAPITAL ACCOUNT REGIME AND FINANCIAL INTEGRATION
Chile has a fully open capital account regime since 2001. The only foreign exchange
regulations that remain specify reporting requirements for statistical purposes. The
information collected is used to prepare the balance of payments, the international
investment position and data on the functioning of foreign exchange markets. However,
some challenges remain, mainly in terms of optimizing the information gathering
process by, for example, reviewing the frequency of reports and making their filing
possible through the internet. By receiving feedback from economic agents, the Central
Bank of Chile is also constantly assessing the need to improve the statistical information
available.
In line with the above, the Free Trade Agreement with the United States establishes the
general principle of free capital mobility and limited controls. In fact, the treaty does not
include any balance of payments exceptions. The agreement only contains some limits
on the actions that can be taken in the event of a dispute involving measures that in
practice restrict capital movements.
7 
An open capital account and financial integration have contributed to an increase in
Chileans’ holdings of foreign assets, which has enhanced the country’s financial
position with regard to the rest of the world. Total assets held by Chilean residents
increased from US$35.6 billion in 1997 to US$64.3 billion in 2003. Portfolio
investments and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) were the two asset categories that rose
the most in response to measures that liberalized capital outflows and fostered
integration of the Chilean economy with rest of the world. Portfolio investment grew
from US$1.2 billion in 1997 to US$19.7 billion in 2003, while FDI went from US$5.1
billion to US$13.8 billion in the same period. By sectors, Chilean corporations were by
far the sector that increased their foreign asset holdings the most, from US$15.1 billion
in 1997 to US$33.0 billion in 2003. Non-banking financial institutions also increased
their foreign assets, from US$0.5 billion to US$12.8 billion over the same period. 
As a result of the faster pace of capital outflow liberalization, Chilean residents
currently hold both larger amounts of and more diversified foreign assets, as the overall
amount is almost evenly distributed among the various asset categories, i.e. Portfolio
Investments, FDI, International Reserves and Other Investment. 
However, several financial crises in the last few years have underlined the need to be
well equipped to face external shocks. Crises can be very costly, and growing
international commercial and financial integration can increase the probability of being
hit by external shocks. Keeping this in mind, Chile has prepared its economy by
                                                          
7 Claims under the dispute settlement mechanism can only be submitted one year after the measures have been
imposed. In the case of capital outflows, no claims can be made for controls imposed for a period of less than one
year if they do not interfere substantially with capital transfers abroad, and are applicable to transfers other than those
associated with Foreign Direct Investment, debt payments or bonds issued abroad. Regarding inflows, no
compensation can be claimed if the restrictions on capital inflows are imposed for less than one year, and do not
substantially impede capital flows. However, if Chile imposes capital controls for more than one year, investors could
submit a claim for the direct damages caused by the controls, a year after the controls have taken effect. 11
building and strengthening the institutions and policy frameworks necessary to
overcome future adverse shocks. 
V. CAPITAL ACCOUNT LIBERALIZATION AND INSTITUTION BUILDING
Chile nowadays has an open capital account, the result of removing the foreign
exchange regulatory body’s restrictions on capital flows, with the focus of foreign
exchange regulations shifting away from restrictions and toward reporting requirements.
This degree of openness was the result of a gradual and prudent process that took
decades to consolidate. In fact, it only concluded once the Central Bank of Chile
considered that the necessary conditions had been achieved.
Historically, Chile imposed capital account restrictions through most of the 20
th century,
starting in a context of high inflation and State intervention in the early 1930s. During
the second half of the 1970s, the country began opening up its capital account,
following a trade liberalization program initiated a few years earlier. The opening up of
the capital account was implemented while, at the same time, a fixed exchange rate
regime was established in the context of high inflation, widespread indexation and a
financial sector that lacked the required prudential regulation and supervision. Despite
the official position, market agents tended to operate under the assumption that the
government somehow backed the soundness and creditworthiness of local financial
institutions and insured the deposit base. In that environment, levels of indebtedness,
maturity gaps between assets and liabilities, related-lending, and foreign currency
mismatches received less attention than they deserved. 
Weak institutions and macro-fundamentals added up to a fragile economic policy
framework, leaving the economy vulnerable. When the 1981 international recession hit
with unexpected severity, it abruptly ended efforts to open up the capital account,
because of the sudden stop of capital flows to developing economies. The deep financial
crisis that then unfolded led to a rapid drain of international reserves, and the fixed
exchange rate regime was abandoned. The devaluation that followed provoked severe
losses across all sectors of the economy.
In the aftermath of the debt crisis, in the mid-eighties the authorities focused on
economic recovery and reorganized the overall macro-financial framework. Drawing on
the recession experience and the subsequent financial crisis, a new banking law was
enacted in 1986 that addressed moral hazard and systemic risk issues, and regulations
governing financial institutions were amended to strengthen the sector. The
development of a local risk-rating industry and the preparation of relevant analysis and
information about the risk features of issuers and the securities they offered in the
market are examples of this. The authorities focused mainly on correcting large external
imbalances and low growth by boosting exports, through a highly competitive exchange
rate. With this in mind, an exchange rate band was used to sustain a depreciated real
exchange rate. Finally, a second wave of privatizations began.
Central Bank independence was established with the approval of a specific law (Ley
Orgánica Constitucional del Banco Central de Chile) in 1989. The CBC’s
independence was established to facilitate and maintain the credibility of its policies.
This has actually happened, giving the Central Bank more room to maneuver in the
short-run and reducing the costs of adjusting to adverse shocks. 12
Given its freedom to determine monetary and exchange rate policy, and consistently
with a world trend toward adopting a nominal anchor, the CBC established explicit
annual inflation targets in 1991, to gradually reduce inflation. This was complemented
by an exchange rate band regime. This policy mix proved very successful in reducing
inflation from an initial level of 27% in 1990 to 3% at the end of the decade. 
At the same time, several factors (including a successful transition to democracy, which
maintained and strengthened the market economy model) favored the voluntary return
of capital flows into the country. Given the macroeconomic policy framework, the
authorities faced a classical monetary policy dilemma, with more policy goals than
independent instruments. The level of domestic interest rates necessary to control
aggregate demand gave rise to incentives for interest-arbitrage capital inflows, within a
context of sharp increases in capital flows to emerging economies. The choice was
either to accept an appreciation of the real exchange rate inconsistent with external
balance or to reduce interest rates, in which case the risks of exchange rate appreciation
would remain small, but inflationary risks would dominate the picture in a highly
indexed economy.
The policy options available included allowing the exchange rate to appreciate, limiting
appreciation through sterilized intervention accompanied by tight fiscal policy to offset
the associated costs, or introducing controls on capital inflows, and at the same time
liberalizing capital outflows. Chile’s strategy was a combination of all. In this scenario,
the CBC decided to open up its capital account, gradually but steadily. 
In terms of capital outflows, opening the capital account went ahead relatively quickly.
In 1991, the procedures for direct investment abroad were streamlined, and banks could
invest up to 40% of their foreign currency deposits abroad. In 1992, the limit on banks’
foreign exchange holdings doubled and export proceeds exempt from surrender
requirements were increased. In 1994, restrictions on profit remittances were lifted,
banks were allowed to invest up to 20% of their capital and reserves abroad, and the
ceilings on institutional investors’ investment abroad were raised. In 1995, the
minimum required stay for foreign direct investment in Chile was reduced from three
years to one. In 1998, the ceiling for banks was raised to 70% of their capital and
reserves, and the ceiling for mutual funds was eliminated. Also, ceilings on investment
abroad were increased for pension funds, life and general insurance companies. All
these measures contributed to increase Chile’s degree of international financial
integration.
On capital inflows, a more gradual approach was followed during the transition to price
stability, together with the implementation of an inflation targeting monetary framework
and the development of a sound domestic financial system. This gradual approach
involved establishing mechanisms to control capital inflows, such as the unremunerated
reserve requirement (URR), in response to the surge in capital flows to Chile. Other
important controls were a minimum holding period for portfolio investments and
stringent requirements for issuing bonds and ADRs abroad.
 8 
The objectives pursued with the URR were to favor equity over debt financing, and
long-term over short-term financing, and to apply a tight monetary policy without
                                                          
8 See Appendix 1 for further details on the URR.13
incurring large current-account deficits. From a macroeconomic standpoint, the URR
was expected to expand the autonomy of monetary policy and simultaneously minimize
the effects on the exchange rate of the tight monetary policy needed to control aggregate
demand. From a macro-prudential point of view, the URR was expected to discourage
short-term capital inflows without affecting long-term foreign investments, especially
FDI. This would in turn reduce the volatility of international capital flows into the
country and, subsequently, exchange rate volatility.
The URR remained in effect during most of the 1990s and in the aftermath of the Asian
crisis. Facing strong pressure against the peso, the CBC cut it down to 10% in late June
1998, then to zero in September 1998, although it continued to exist in the norm. 
Overall, several studies suggest that the URR had the following effects on the Chilean
economy (among others, Valdés and Soto (1998), Edwards (1998, 2000), De Gregorio,
Edwards and Valdés (2000), Gallego, Hernández and Schmidt-Hebbel (1999), Gallego
and Hernández (2002)):
a)  It created a wedge between domestic and external interest rates, allowing monetary
policy more independence. 
b)  It modified the composition of capital flows, raising the share of medium- and long-
term inflows
c)  It did not, however, affect the real exchange rate or the overall size of capital
inflows
d)  It created some discrimination in companies’ access to capital, since the cost of the
URR weighed more heavily on small businesses facing stricter financial restrictions
and higher financing costs.
e)  Loopholes had to be constantly plugged, as some sought to avoid the regulation. 
f)  It produced distortions in capital versus labor costs, redistributing income in favor
of capital owners and distorting resource allocation somewhat.
At the regulatory level, the URR was removed in April 2001. At the same time, the
CBC eliminated all remaining foreign exchange restrictions. The completion of the
process of gradually deregulating foreign exchange markets was geared to provide
businesses and individuals with more direct and efficient access to the benefits of
financial and trade integration, helping to boost potential growth and better diversify the
risks that threatened the Chilean economy.
Achieving the medium-term objective of completely opening up the capital account was
possible once the authorities considered fundamentals and institutions were strong
enough to shield the country from external shocks, and thus suitable to give Chile the
full benefit of more financial integration. The elimination of the URR and all remaining
foreign exchange restrictions in April 2001 took into account the following list of
conditions:
9 
a)  Adopting a floating exchange rate regime with inflation targeting; 
                                                          
9 Press Release of the Central Bank of Chile of April 16
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b)  Price stability; 
c)  Improving banking regulation and supervision; 
d)  Developing markets for derivative instruments to make good hedging instruments
more available, to provide better coverage of exchange risk;
e)  A suitable level of international reserves; 
f)  A more diversified trade structure;
g)  A solvent financial system, and
h)  A solid and prudent fiscal position, by establishing a fiscal rule based on achieving a
1% structural fiscal surplus. 
Once these preconditions were met, Chile moved on to its current position, with a fully
open capital account.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Today Chile has completely opened up its capital account and reduced the risks
associated with volatile capital flows. The Chilean institution building process has
focused on solid fundamentals, but with a high degree of built-in flexibility, in both the
monetary and the fiscal policy frameworks. This is reflected in a monetary regime based
on inflation targeting, a strong fiscal policy based on a structural budget surplus rule,
and a floating exchange rate, all complemented by strong but evolving financial sector
regulation and supervision. 
This policy and institutional framework has reduced the volatility caused by internal
factors, such as policy inconsistencies, one-way bets, implicit insurance or moral
hazard. At the same time, it cushions the effects of volatile capital flows, as adjustments
are made more through prices than through quantities, with agents internalizing risks.
Building institutions is a long-term process that can take years or even decades. Along
with the initial efforts to open the economy during the second half of the 1970s and the
early 1980s, an important mistake was made: restrictions on the capital account were
relaxed without a consistent monetary policy framework and an adequately regulated
banking sector. 
The high costs of the crisis in the early 1980s gave way to a more conservative, more
gradual approach. Arguably, the pace and form of the opening could have been better,
but at least earlier mistakes were avoided. Today Chile is enjoying the benefits of its
international financial integration with reasonable assurances against the risks
associated to free and volatile capital flows. Of course, many challenges remain, among
them continuing to fine-tune the monetary policy framework, consolidating the fiscal
policy framework, and modernizing the financial system.15
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APPENDIX 1: THE UNREMUNERATED RESERVE REQUIREMENT
This appendix provides a more detailed description of the unremunerated reserve
requirement (URR). Figure 1 below illustrates how the URR worked, by identifying its
main features expressed as equivalent financial cost. This cost depended on the foreign
interest rate, the spread applied to the borrower, the URR rate, and the duration of the
foreign investment. From the implied equivalent financial cost, we can see that for a
given interest rate and spread, the shorter the investment period, the higher the implicit
financial cost. Because of how it was set up, the URR favored longer-term investments
with a lower implicit financial cost, and penalized shorter-term investments with a
higher implicit financial cost. It aimed at deterring interest rate arbitrage on short-term
maturities by filling all or part of the gap between domestic and international interest
rates. In effect, the URR was intended to modify the covered interest parity condition
for short maturities, since it would allow for higher domestic short-term interest rates
for a given interest rate parity. 
The URR was an indirect, price-based measure that operated as an asymmetric Tobin
tax, since it taxed capital inflows and not outflows. It was introduced in June 1991, and
initially covered all foreign loans except trade-related credits. The initial reserve rate
was set at 20% on all new credits, it was held for the entire term to 90 days and one
year, and denominated in the currency of the credit. Over time, URR coverage and
reserve rates were increased in response to evasion and further increases in capital
flows. In 1992 the reserve requirement was raised to 30% and the holding period was
fixed at one year regardless of the credit’s maturity. At the same time, coverage was
extended to non-debt flows, which had become a channel for short-term portfolio
inflows. In particular, foreign currency deposits in commercial banks became subject to
the URR in 1992, as were secondary American Depository Receipts (ADRs) in 1995.
While foreign direct investment was generally exempted from the URR, in 1996 foreign
direct investment of a potentially speculative nature, namely foreign direct investment
related credits, were also subjected to it. 
FIGURE 1 























20% URR     